List of DGCA India Airworthiness Directives on the ALH Dhruv civil variant

Here is a list of all the  Airworthiness Directives issued by  DGCA India for the Civil variant of the ALH Dhruv (2008-to 2023). Source - DGCA website www.dgca.gov.in

Airworthiness Directive (AD). A regulatory document which identifies aeronautical products in which an unsafe condition exists, and where the unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop in other aeronautical products of the same type design. It prescribes mandatory corrective actions to be taken, or the conditions or limitations under which the aeronautical products may continue to be operated. The AD is the  common form of mandatory continuing airworthiness information mentioned in Annex 8.

Source: ICAO Doc 9760 - Airworthiness Manual

(Thanks to Commander MK Singh for compiling this list. He has extensive flying in the Navy and Civil aviation. He is a crusader for safety in helicopter flight operations and part of the working group of the VAST under VAI)

1/7/08
 
1.  AD 001- On one of the DHRUV helicopters, during inspection of IGB area, a crack was noticed. Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness  Directive is being issued for visual inspection and submit the compliance certificate to Certification and Airworthiness Group of RWR&DC, HAL, Bangalor

2.  AD 002 - Crack was noticed at the bolt head of five bolt-blade fork (big) of two DHRUV helicopters.

3.  AD 003 -  Hydraulic System – 1 pressure and fluid loss was reported on one of the DHRUV helicopters. Likely cause of the leak was attributed to the rubbing of hydraulic hoses with LH TGB fairing.

4.  AD -004 -  On one of the DHRUV helicopter, there was an in flight warning for collective pitch anticipator (CPA) redundancy failure for engine-2. During check CPA connector was found to be loose. As a result of this, loss of CPA input to the FADEC has resulted and caused failure of CPA redundancy for engine-2.

5.  AD 004 - On another DHRUV helicopter, there was a warning for CPA failure on both the FADEC when collective pitch was lowered after touch down. On investigation, it was observed that the CPA input to both FADEC was out of range. Further it was found that CPA moving end check nut was loose and tab washer used for locking the check nut was bent incorrectly. These factors had contributed to the CPA rigging disturbance and were the cause for the snag.

6.  AD 004 - There was an in-flight power loss warning followed with large split in NG, TGT and torque parameters of the two engines. Investigations with diagnostic PC revealed that FADEC2 had logged CPA failure. On checking CPA circuit, one wire on the flying lead of CPA was found cut at about 4 inches from the connector due to sharp fold in the CPA flying lead.

2/3/09

7.  AD 009 - Rotors Flight Control – Rotor Control – Marking on cyclic stick, trimming of L-angle of separator wall, provision of additional safety and modification of fork assembly.

 1. To facilitate proper placement of rigging tool on cyclic stick during rigging, a marking on cyclic stick is provided.

2. Trimming of L-angle to clear interference with hydraulic tube bushes.

3. Added safety by introduction of split pin.

4.  To increase clearance between FDR/CVR potentiometer as well as coll pick off fixed end and fork assembly by decreasing the lug width of fork assembly

8.  AD 010 - Stabilizers – Vertical Stabilizer – Installation of web stiffener on front spar of fin torsion box assembly. To reinforce the front spar of fin torsion box assembly, as per board of inquiry recommendation.

9.  AD 011 - During flight when HF transmission is on, amber light of tail rotor vibration warning system flickered. To rectify problem it was proposed by RWR&DC to replace the existing velocimeter Model No 7310 with velocimeter Model No. 8866-1 having improved EMI/EMC shielding.

16/02/10

10.  AD 012R 1 - Rotor Drive (s) –Gearbox(es) – One time check for presence of water in MGB lubricating oil of Dhruv helicopter IDS assembly.

A case of water ingress into IDS assembly on one of Dhruv helicopter  was noticed in 2006. Detailed investigation revealed that water ingress into Main Gear Box was through top cover (p/n: 201P620H 0000 207) of IDS. It was also observed that non-standard “O” ring was used, which resulted in improper sealing against water.

 Usage of correct size “O” ring as per drawing was emphasised and as an improvement sealing of top cover using sealant was introduced as additional feature against water ingress.

 A recent case of water ingress has come to notice on one of Dhruv helicopters. Preliminary investigation revealed existence of a connector on IDS inspection cover (p/n: 201P 636H 0006 201). This inspection cover, with connector on it, is not a standard part as per SOP. Further, the “O” ring of the top cover was found damaged. It is possible that IDS with such inspection cover and damaged “O” ring installed on top cover might have led to seepage of water into MGB of IDS.

The water presence in lube oil of IDS has very serious effects like corrosion.

11.  AD 013R 1 - NAVIGATION – Dependent Position Determination – Design improvement in GPS antenna bracket.

1. On some of the Dhruv helicopters, incidents of GPS antenna along with bracket and connector breaking away from main structure during flights were reported.

2. Investigation by Failure Review Board attributed the failure of sheet metal antenna bracket to its inherent strength deficiency. Replacement of existing GPS antenna bracket with machined bracket was recommended.

3. Part breaking away from aircraft during flight may cause injury to person  or damage property on ground.

12.  AD 015R 1- TAIL ROTOR DRIVE – Gearboxes – Installation of modified parts of AGB assembly to control the interfacing tolerance for avoiding low lube oil pressure.

Controlling of the interfacing tolerance of AGB assembly (P/N 201P 655H 0000 001) parts to avoid internal leakage and to overcome low lube oil pressure of ALH AGB assembly.

01/04/10

13.  AD 016 -  Cracks were reported on two TRA flange assemblies.

HYDRAULIC POWER – Main – Additional inspections of tail rotor actuator (TRA) flange assembly for crack.

20/08/10

14.  AD 017R 1 - Collective eye end of UCS connecting rod were found broken on two Dhruv helicopter after their forced landings

ROTOR (S) – Rotor heads(s) – One time check on connecting rod assemblies (UCS) for crack detection.

15.  AD 018 -  Crack was noticed at threaded area of bolt-blade fork (big) on DHRUV helicopter.

Rotor (S) – Rotor BLADES – One time fluorescent dye penetrant CD check on bolt blade fork (big) - MRB.

16.  AD 019 - Free play of approximately 5 mm was observed on TRA assembly during 1000 hours inspection. Based on detailed inspection and study, vendor has identified that “PINs”p/n 3101-010 used on TRA p/n 3101-000 from serial number 40 to 145 are not heat treated to the drawing requirement. Existence of this condition significantly reduces the fatigue life and may lead to loss of directional control.

HYDRAULIC POWER – Main – One time check on tail rotor actuator

2/11/10

17.  AD 020 - Crack was found during inspection on LH side of horizontal stabilizer mounting bracket fitted on vertical fin spar and IGB rib.

STABILIZER – Vertical stabilizer – One time check for crack on IGB rib on fin torsion box assembly & tail boom assembly AFT

09/06/11

18.  AD 021 - Engine oil leakage was reported by pilot after last flight. On inspection, rear bearing lubricating oil pipe (return line) found damaged.

AIR CONDITIONING – Distribution – One time check on interference of air conditioning tube with engine oil scavenge pipe and modification for introducing improved clearanc

19.  AD 022 - . In some of Dhruv helicopters cracks were observed in IGB rib bottom and associated area of fin torsion box assembly

STABILIZERS – Vertical Stabilizer – Reinforcement of IGB bottom rib and strengthening ofIGB rib in fin torsion box assembly.

04/07/11

20.  AD 023 - During a sortie on one of the military Dhruv helicopter, at hover, prior to take off, low rotor warning was observed. Helicopter carried out a safe precautionary landing. On further investigation, it was noticed that the fixed eye‐end of the collective pitch anticipator (CPA), p/n 34LL03C502W3290 was detached from the body of CPA. Such failure may affect handling qualities of helicopter adversely.

Engine Controls – Power Control – Inspection of collective pitch anticipator.

02/09/11

21.  AD 024 - In one of the civil Dhruv helicopter, it was observed that the elastomeric bush (p/n201P 636H 3000 201) was seating on the radius of TDS sleeve. This was due to the bearing flange assembly was done towards tail rotor side of TDS support bracket instead of towards FWD side of the helicopter. This wrong assembly may lead to gradual failure of the bearing leading to loss of tail drive power6

TAIL ROTOR DRIVE‐ Shafts – Check of elastomeric bush seating position on tail drive shaft assemblies (Seg.‐3 & Seg.‐4) in situ on the helicopter

27/02/12

22.  AD 025 - The Alert Service Bulletin “One time torque check on mounting bolts of Main Rotor Blade” is issued on the basis of recommendation made in preliminary
investigation report on accident to BSF (Air Wing) Dhruv helicopte r VT-BSH (DW63) on 19-10-2011.

This AD, which prescribes/mandates action to be performed on to helicopters as stated above to restore an acceptable level of safety is hereby issued pursuant to CAR 21.3B. TC holder/ Operators are required to comply with the above stated AD within the
stipulated time.

23/07/12

23.  AD 026 - During investigation of some of the incidents of Advanced Light Helicopter (Dhruv) owned by defense forces, it was found that the collective eye-ends of connecting rod assembly were broken.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified which is likely to develop on other Advanced Light Helicopters of similar type design,this Airworthiness Directive is being issued for installation of improved steel eye-ends in place of existing titanium eye-ends to achieve higher fatigue strength.

24.  AD 027 - In one of the civil Dhruv Helicopter, step marks at spline area of input flange of Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) was reported.

25.  AD 028 - In one of the Military Dhruv Helicopter, Pilot observed physical travel of collective lever obstructed at corresponding torque of 72 percent. Defect
investigation revealed that the clip assembly connecting FDR/CVR
potentiometer to control rod was found displaced by approximately 20mm upward from its designated position.

Introduction of split pins in FDR/CVR potentiometer attachments of cyclic and directional channels.

21/03/13

26.  AD 030 - In accordance with the para 3.3 (v) of GM 21.91 of CAR 21, this
modification is considered as mandatory Major Modification by the TC holder as an unsafe condition has been identified which exists in other Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH)-Dhruv

This Airworthiness Directive is issued

i. To provide visual inspection means for opening and closing of pilot door , co-pilot door, sliding door and hinged doors; and

ii. To provide door opening and locking instructions on clamshell door.

02/12/14

27.  AD 031 - During 500 hrs servicing if a civil variant Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv, it is observed that the cylindrical roller at the input side of IGB was overheated and damaged. This damge is attributable to Oil starvation. The type of failure is considered critical as it may affect drive line from MGB to TGB.

19/02/15

28.  AD 032 - In one of the ALH dent mark was observed on end plate RH side. Aldo dent and erosion on protection strip delamination was observed on TRB. It was found that one screw from TGB fairing RHS-Attachment came out and hit the TRB first then got embedded into plate. This type of failure is considered critical and it may affect both TRB & End Plate.

17/10/16

29.  AD 034 - During 500 inspection change in CT density was observed on collar region of some of the main rotor blades of Dhruv helicopters. This indicates onset of local delamination.

01/06/17

30.  AD 035 - In one of the ALH restrictions of movement was observed in the longitudinal circuit on Main Rotor Actuator(MRA)  and Tail Rotor Actuator (TRA). Restriction on movement of circuit would lead to reduced controllability of helicopter. This type of failure is considered critical and it may affect controllability of helucopter.

19-10-2011

31.  AD 036. Multiple occurrences of abnormal sound/possible surge and power loss of TM333-2B2 engines installed on ALH Dhruv Civil Helicopters along with vibration and jerks in cockpit during flight.

02/02/21

32.  AD 037 - On one of the Military(IAF) helicopter during flight, Hydraulic System-1 Low level warning light came on and helicopter made precautionary landing. On further inspection Crack was observed on the valve body lug of Main Rotor collective Actuator of system-2 and failure of the lug resulted in the leakage of the hydraulic oil from O-Ring interface

13/07/23

33.  AD 039 - During a routine sortie, Indian Navy ALH MK-III helicopter ditched into water close to Mumbai coast on 08/03/23 where in control loss in the collective channel was noticed during the flight. Post incident inspection control rod body in the collective control circuit was found broken.

My comments on this exhaustive list of ADs.

1. So many refer to the CPA (Collective Pitch Anticipator) -far too many. The problem is listed from 2008 and caused due to incorrect wiring, bad quality of the CPA bracket and so on. Clearly a workmanship issue. Really!!! Does it take so many incidents for HAL to realise there is a problem? My helicopter suffered this failure in 2004, the AD is issued in 2008. It means that there must have been countless more failures in between!

2. Water ingress into the MGB relates to use of the incorrect 'O' ring. This is only replaced at the OEM, so the operator had no hand in this. Again, it is the quality of workmanship at HAL. Water ingress into the sealed MGB is really really bad news.

3. Instances of the collective eye-end failures. Again a clear sign of vibration being the culprit.

4.  ...identified that “PINs”p/n 3101-010 used on TRA p/n 3101-000 from serial number 40 to 145 are not heat treated to the drawing requirement. This means that unsafe items have been installed at HAL during production. 

5. The AD AD 013R 1 is issued in 2010 and mentions that the GPS antenna bracket flew off. This had happened to a Naval helicopter in 2007, so it looks like HAL waited till 2010 before informing the DGCA only when a Civil helicopter lost its GPS antenna.

6. Rubbing of hydraulic pipelines is again a clear case of bad workmanship at HAL. We had so many pipelines rubbing and wearing out, but more of this later.

The CPA is the Collective Pitch Anticipator. Whenever there is an increase in power demand by moving the collective lever up, the engine rpm tends to lag because the fuel pump governor takes time to sense the transient droop in the turbine rpm before feeding more fuel to the engine.
All FADEC engines (like the ALH) use an electronic means of providing an advance information of the position of the collective pitch lever to the engine. This way, the engine already knows the collective is going up and provides more fuel at a faster rate when increasing the collective. So the CPA is something like the ‘coarse’ control for fuel, and the stepper motor / N2 sensing  does the fine tuning. The opposite happens when reducing the collective and an rpm overshoot is prevented. Mi8 pilots will identify very well with this phenomenon, without a FADEC and the CPA.

In case the CPA stops sending signals to the engine(s) then an increase in collective will cause the N2 and Rotor RPM to droop, giving a “Rotor Low” audio. This is what happened to me, luckily we were on ground. Imaging this happening to both engines in the air – wild swings of the rotor rpm, and the pilot just won’t know what hit him. The reason? A very badly made bracket where the CPA is attached to the airframe, or shoddy wiring.

 

The Polaris isn't shining - Why the ALH Dhruv is so frequently in the news for all the wrong reasons

The heart-wrenching sight of the smoke billowing from the crashed Indian Coast Guard (ICG) helicopter at Porbandar on January 5th, 2025 brought back to my mind the struggles we had with HAL when I was commanding one of the first two ALH Flights of the Indian Navy. 

This particular crash seen here in the picture has been attributed to a rare transmission defect  as per some news reports.

 

ALH crash site at Porbandar airport - 5th Jan 2025 - Photo Google search, news reports

The term “rare” means ‘not happening very often’. In so many of the ALH crashes, there is a new 'rare' defect each time, so the term 'rare' loses its meaning. So many ‘new-and-rare’ defects on this helicopter, more than 20 years after it was handed over to customers, can only point to an inherent problem with the design or the manufacturing.
HAL has a responsibility to deliver machines that are safe, efficient, and that meet the product specifications. The ALH however, is sadly lacking in the safety and efficiency department. HAL is also a listed company and has an obligation to the shareholders to come clean with the problems. There have been close to 25 ALH crashes in India since 2005, out of the 340 aircraft produced. Many of these crashes are due to a technical failure. Some, although attributed to pilot error, might actually have a design or manufacturing problem as the root cause.
This Porbandar crash has been attributed to the swashplate. Those who want to read about swashplates can click here and here for some videos. 

The ALH has a basic problem with vibration and control forces. The ARIS (Anti Resonance Isolation System) that was designed to isolate MGB vibrations has not performed as well as it was supposed to. HAL has therefore installed active vibration control (AVC) systems in the helicopter to increase comfort by damping vibrations in localised areas like the pilot seat and passenger locations. MGB vibrations continued to be higher than permitted, so destructive failures began to show up at various weak points on the entire transmission and control system over the years. After each crash or accident that revealed control rods had broken, the OEM continued replacing these with stronger ones. The basic problem, viz. the MGB vibration was still not adequately addressed. The last iteration was the modification for changeover to stainless steel rods after the Navy IN 709 ditching. Due to all these modifications the proverbial weak link kept shifting upwards in the control chain, and now the swashplate has become the latest victim.  The next stage will probably be to modify the swashplate... and so on. How long can this continue without addressing the basic problems in the design? 

Here is a diagram of a generic control system and the transmission. The control rods are marked in red. The circled part is the pair of swashplates. In the ALH, these rods been failing from time to time.

 Diagram of helicopter controls (source https://aviation.stackexchange.com)

The ALH swashplate arrangement is unique because all the pitch change rods and swashplate are covered by a titanium drum also called the stub shaft. HAL claimed this was a breakthrough in design, because it protected the control rods from battle damage and reduced the height of the mast. No other 5-ton helicopter uses such a design. The mandatory daily inspection of the control rods can never be done on the IDS, so any incipient crack or defect remains hidden until a catastrophic failure occurs. A line diagram of the ALH swashplate is given below with the failed component marked. The portion shaded cyan / blue is the titanium drum and the swashplates as well as control rods are enclosed in it.

IDS cutaway view showing failed swashplate area

Below is a photograph of the IDS. The sealed part with the yellow tape attached is the stub shaft. 

IDS photo

The ALH rigid rotor has a very high virtual hinge offset (close to 17%). Due to this offset, the control forces (or the Mast Moment) in turns and manoeuvers can exceed the airframe limits, leading to possible incipient or unrecorded exceedances. Cumulative stresses will lead to catastrophic failures over time.

If one of the rods connecting to the swashplate breaks then the pilot’s  movement on the cockpit controls will not be transmitted to the main rotor. The helicopter will crash.

The Mk III MR helicopters use a new version of MGB/IDS that suffer from major problems. At least 10 or 11 IDS / MGBs of the ICG helicopters and some in the Naval ALHs are said to have been rejected and replaced by HAL. This itself should have rung alarm bells, because a manufacturer never rejects an MGB without serious reason. Possibly the same component had failed on all the IDS assemblies. Sources indicate that items such as the quill shaft that drive the cooler fan have had many failures. If undetected, such failures can cause cascading and catastrophic breakdown in the entire MGB because the gear drive is the same. 

A Mk III IAF helicopter with new Shakti engines crashed into the water in Bihar while delivering relief materials, and the crew had to be rescued by the very people they supposed to provide assistance to. The Army's ALH Mk IIIs and Mk IVs have crashed due to control difficulties in the recent years. All these have been relatively new airframes.

When I was in the unit, any problems that we brought up were often glossed over by HAL when discussing them with the headquarters. This would be buttressed with the assurance that things will be fixed, and impressing upon everyone that the ALH was still under development and the problems were a part of the learning process. We never received feedback for corrective actions on defects that we had put up. My helicopter had a CPA (collective pitch anticipator) failure on ground just before takeoff. If this had failed in flight, then both engines would have swung wildly in flight for no apparent reason. HAL dismissed this as a failure of the component without bothering about the seriousness of the effect in flight. It turned out that the CPA bracket was quite shoddily made and hence failed.

Using band-aid for bullet wounds was frequently resorted to. One glaring example is the catastrophic failure of the Tail Gearbox (TGB) on a Navy helicopter in 2005. The helicopter was being ferried from Hyderabad to the ship at Visakhapatnam in July 2005. While landing on the deck, the crew noticed the tail rotor blades were shaking excessively. After a quick shutdown, we saw this horrible sight.

Oil drained out of the TGB, the metal strip that debonded, and the shattered TGB mounting legs

.

We carried out a thorough inspection of the other two helicopters on the ship and found a second TGB with a crack.
Here is the picture.

Crack on 2nd helicopter TGB due to over-shimming during installation at HAL

 

The HAL team arrived on the ship to replace the blades and TGB that were cannibalised from their production helicopter. We questioned the wisdom of doing this without a detailed investigation to prevent recurrence, especially since two out of three helicopters had cracks on the TGBs. HAL tried to reassure us saying that we should not connect the two incidents. They explained that the second TGB had failed because of over-shimming during installation at HAL, so the reasons were different and no cause for worry. They repaired and flew the first helicopter without any investigation. We in the unit found it very difficult to toe this line of action. 

Barely four months down the line in Nov 2005, the first ALH crashed during a ferry from Hyderabad enroute to Ranchi for delivery to the Government of Jharkhand. The TGB had separated from the helicopter and was found lying a few kilometres away from the crashed helicopter. An HAL technical person taken as a passenger was using a kit specially installed only for this flight to monitor tail rotor vibrations. This itself meant that the helicopter was suspect, because such equipment is not used on any routine flight. He gave a warning that the vibrations were reaching the limit, shortly after which the TGB flew away. If HAL had seriously heeded our request in July 2005 for a detailed investigation, this crash in Nov 2005 could have been avoided. The point is that there have been hundreds of such near-misses that could have become catastrophic accidents, but deeper study was always ignored. As an OEM of a developmental helicopter, HAL should have carefully documented each and every failure in every system tracing the defect to its origin to fix the basic issue right from the beginning. Unfortunately, their doctrine of getting the helicopters back in the air, Some How In Time, has ensured that no defect is taken seriously enough. We ended up living from accident to accident with no real safety being ensured. In the case of the November 2005 Jharkhand helicopter crash, investigation revealed many lacunae in the manufacturing and QC processes. Helicopters remained grounded for almost 6 months during this. That helicopter had crashed due to the same reason - the debonded tail rotor blade just like it happened on the Navy helicopter in July!! It is important to note that there is no report of this accident on the DGCA website. Hence there is no public knowledge of why it happened.
 
Unfortunately, even after the latest accident in Jan 25, the aftermath will likely be some lip service to one-time checks, minor design changes, and attributing blame to training and maintenance at the user. The OEM would most likely again stress on how robust their design is, and that there is really nothing major to fix. Certificates of acceptability from some foreign design team will be waved at us and life will go on. But not for the unfortunate families, and the squadron.
There will also be a lot of talk about how the Services must support indigenisation and local manufacturing. A lot will be said about how HAL is also developing the latest platforms and serving the Armed Forces of India. The public has seen and heard the interaction between top managements of the IAF and HAL at the Aero India Bangalore in Feb 2025, so I will not go into that aspect.

‘Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth”, is a law of propaganda often attributed to one particular Propaganda Minister from the last century.

The MK III and IV on paper have it all- a modern glass cockpit, a great avionics suite consisting of EO pods, machine guns, surveillance radars and all. These are indeed excellent additions to the capabilities. However, this equipment will work well on whichever platform they are installed on, whether land, sea or air. Such equipment does not make the basic helicopter platform inherently fantastic. If the helicopter platform itself is still going through birthing pains, then there is need to retrospect and transform. No amount of embellishments can hide what actually lies beneath.  Blind reliance on a single-vendor-supplied machine has led us to this situation; indigenous or not isn't the issue here. HAL knows that the armed forces are a captive customer  base, unable to complain or to go anywhere else to buy helicopters. How then will the OEM be forced to improve his product, if there is no competition and the customers are constrained to buy whatever HAL manufactures?

Yes, the ALH has done immense amount of good work in the high altitude regions, as also during flood and other relief work from Kerala to the Himalayas. There is nothing which can take away from that. The men that operate the machines are fantastic and indeed hats off to their skill, perseverance and grit in getting the jobs done.

The designers have also done a lot of work on making a flying machine. However the sum is less than the total of the parts and this is most unfortunate.

It must be emphasised that HAL exists to support the Armed Forces, and not the other way around. There is a lot written about how the Services must support Atmanirbharta, but at what cost? The Armed forces have a task and that is, to fight the external enemy. They should be able fully trust the HAL product and not have to keep worrying about when the next catastrophic failure will occur from within.  

I am not a nay-sayer for the indigenous cause. I am not a supporter of blind import or blind Atmanirbharta. Safety has to remain paramount. All through the period that I flew the ALH, my crew and I remained motivated and eager to fly this Indian designed and manufactured helicopter to its limits. The unit had always given complete feedback both to HAL and to the Indian Navy to see how we can all improve things. Sadly, nobody listened and not enough has improved in the safety and efficiency of the ALH.

Even the CAG report in 2010 has painted a  less than rosy picture of the entire project. Those who can read between the lines will realise that there is lots gone unsaid. Has it really made a difference to anybody?

What can now be done?

• First – stop further production, take a pause. The Services must stop accepting any more helicopters from HAL, until all such problems are sorted out for good. The same must apply for any new products from HAL.
• HAL in consultation with the customers, should go back to the data, evaluate each and every failure of every major component, to find out what is the worst cumulative effect that a particular defect can have, if left unnoticed and unchecked. There are countless records of near-misses in which helicopters had a providential escape after a catastrophic failure. This is very important data and must not be glossed over. There are various methods to report serious defects in each service and these also can be starting points.
• Share the crucial data from accident investigations and also from serious defects with all the operators. The ALH is flying both in the civilian and military registration. Hence it is most important that results of all inquiries into serious incidents and accidents from the three services, as well as the defect reports are shared amongst all operators, including the DGCA. Openness is the first step to acceptance and thereafter rectification actions can follow. Operational data can be removed before declassifying the core contents of the military crash reports. To give an example, DGCA has issued 32 Airworthiness Directives on the civil version of the Dhruv with less than a dozen of them flying. 
• HAL must talk to the customers and take a consolidated list of their gripe-sheets. They should honestly evaluate the root cause of each point, and see what can be done to fix it both in the existing fleet or during future production.
• Ensure that manufacturing at HAL is done exactly as per the drawings, with precision and care - something that is often lacking.
• Re-evaluate the basic design, and do not put more good money after bad. If for example, the IDS is indeed the main design factor at fault then a high-powered committee must determine how to overcome this once and for all. HAL owes it to the men in uniform that fly, maintain and travel in these machines to make sure that there is 100% safety. Short-cut or quick-fix solutions should not be suggested nor be accepted.
  

A heartfelt prayer for the unfortunate souls that lost their lives in the crash in January, and for their families.

I hope HAL is listening. I hope that the Services do not get steamrolled into accepting machines that are unreliable and need constant fixing. I hope and pray that there are no more crashes of the ALH due to technical failures.

Jai Hind!!